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DOCTRINE IN A VACUUM: 
REFLECTIONS ON WHAT A LAW 
SCHOOL OUGHT (AND OUGHT 
NOT) TO BEt 
James Boyd White* 
Although this paper will reach a wider audience, in it I mean 
mainly to address the students and faculty of the University of 
Michigan Law School. It is meant to be part of a conversation in 
which members of this community talk to each other about the 
life they share. 
I have written elsewhere about the expectations-the fears 
and hopes-that one can appropriately bring to law school. In 
this paper I speak to those who are immersed in ·the process of 
legal education, on one side of the podium or the other, and wish 
to say something of what I think it is, and can be, all about. 
THE CARICATURE 
I want to begin with a common caricature of what legal educa-
tion has become. This account is of course false as a description 
of a particular course or a particular student, but it is widely 
believed and has enough truth in it to make it worth paying at-
tention to, if only as a cultural artifact. According to this version 
of our experience, the first year of law school is a great success. 
During it our students learn the basic methods of legal analysis: 
how to read a case, a little about how to read a statute, how to 
write legal memoranda and briefs, and how to take exams. From 
the students' point of view, this year is exciting, often trans-
forming. Pushed by your circumstances and yourself as perhaps 
you have never been pushed before, you find resources you did 
not know you had and discover yourselves undergoing a 
profound cha_nge, from being bright young students_ to being 
t Copyright c 1985, James Boyd White. 
* Professor of Law and Professor of English Language and Literature, University of 
Michigan. A.B., 1960, Amherst College; A.M., 1961, LL.B., 1964, Harvard University. I 
wish to thank Christina Whitman for helpful comments; and Alissa Kampner for my 
title. 
251 
252 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:2 
bright young lawyers, ready to go to work in the world. You have 
at last found something that you can actually do, and many of 
you have summer jobs in which you learn that people are willing 
to pay you for doing it. From the faculty's point of view, the 
first-year classes are said to be full of life and questioning and 
energy, a pleasure to teach. This is, after all, the moment at 
which we help people move into our profession-in which they 
become like us-and that is bound to be felt as confirming. 
According to this caricature the first year is a glorious success. 
It is followed, however, by two years of relative failure. For some 
reason the courses seem to become boring and routine, and stu-
dents lose interest and become passive. They focus their atten-
tion first on getting a job and second on learning the doctrinal 
material that they think will prepare them in a practical way for 
the world they are about to enter. The result, at its worst, is a 
kind of contempt for the courses, for the theoretical conception 
of law that their teachers seem to have, and for the intellectual 
process in which they are themselves engaged. We see this in the 
attempts by some students to turn our courses into bar review 
courses, which can adequately be "studied for" by mastering a 
Gilbert's Outline or some such "study aid." In the words of one 
student (words that provide my title) on premises such as these 
a law school education becomes a process of exposure to "doc-
trine in a vacuum." Classes that fit this stereotype are marked 
by passivity or resistance, unconcern, inattention, and a kind of 
disguised hostility on both sides of the podium. 
Is this caricature true? Not in any easy sense, I believe, for, at 
least in my experience, students at Michigan, including those in 
the upper classes, have for the most part been intellectually en-
gaged and open, receptive to expel'imentation, and both patient 
and generous with my efforts in the classroom. And I see around 
me a faculty whose intellectual liveliness, openness, and energy 
scarcely fit the mold required by the caricature. But in another 
sense the caricature is true, for even if it is descriptively false it 
in some way represents a set of expectations against which both 
faculty and students report themselves as having to struggle. 
One hears both teachers and students talk as if the caricature 
were real, and this in a way makes it real. I think, then, that it is 
not an accurate picture of this law school but that it is an accu-
rate picture of forces at work within the law school, perhaps at 
work in each of us, and there is value in thinking about its ori-
gins and implications. 
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To begin with the questions of origins, one common explana-
tion for what happens in the last two years of law school is that 
we are all, students and teachers alike, the victims of our suc-
cess. In this view, what we call the "case method" of law teach-
ing works very well when it is new and transforming, but by the 
time it has been adequately mastered by the students, its use 
becomes repetitive, boring, and routine. A wonderfully exciting 
educational experience degenerates into a mechanical and empty 
ritual that robs it of almost all value, a transformation in which 
both sides are complicitous. 
One might put it this way. In the first year of law school, the 
student discovers that she will be responsible for reading the pe-
culiar texts that define the law as she has perhaps never been 
responsible for anything before. She must make sense of these 
cases on her own, and from many points of view, and to do that 
she must learn to pay attention of a new kind to the material 
before her. Much of the life of her education lies in the process 
by which she comes to see the text in a new way: to be read not 
for the main idea or general principle, but reconstructively and 
imaginatively; to be taken apart and put together again; to be 
treated as a piece of the alien legal world in which she will 
shortly have to make her way. The text is made to yield every 
drop of evidence about that life that the imagination can make 
it yield. What is more, the texts must be arranged in patterns of 
significance, patterns that work surprising changes in the mean-
ing of the individual texts themselves. This education works in 
the first instance by directing the attention to a series of texts 
and holding it there: making the texts the object of seemingly 
unlimited questioning. 
In this process, at least in its ideal form, the student is treated 
not as a student, in the old-fashioned sense of one who is to ac-
quire information, but as an active mind, presented with difficul-
ties she must address herself, to which there is no "answer." At 
the best, she is treated as a composer, a maker of compositions, 
as one who must use the disparate materials of legal discourse to 
create meanings for herself, and for others. She must do this 
under the guidance not of some external figure, some set of right 
or wrong answers, but of her own developing sense of autonomy 
and capacity and responsibility. When this works well the stu-
dent feels that in learning law she is engaged in something truly 
important and that her teachers feel this way too. Indeed, what 
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could be more important than learning to engage the mind at 
that point where intellect and power meet to face the perpetual 
question of what justice should mean? When it works well, the 
student feels a related sense of ethical significance as well: that 
learning to be intelligent, scrupulous, and creative in the service 
at once of one's client and of the larger community is to acquire 
a character worth having, one's own version of the character of 
the trustworthy and competent lawyer. (This is, at its best, what 
the classroom drill about precision and accuracy in stating facts, 
holdings, and so forth, is really about.) The heart of this educa-
tion is learning to be responsible in a new way for what one 
thinks and says. You have to make sense of it all yourself, for no 
one can do it for you. You have to think for yourself in circum-
stances forever new, to reach conclusions for which you are re-
sponsible, to decide for yourself what is worth saying and what 
is not. This constitutes an active education, a learning-to-do, not 
a passive acquisition of knowledge; when it works well, it tests 
the limits of your mind and imagination. 
At the end of the first year, or perhaps during it, everything 
seems to shift, and the negative version of law school I described 
above seems to come into existence (or, for some, simply into 
prominence). Like the ideal account of the first year, this version 
is not in any simple way "true," but it does seem to catch some 
of the feelings that many people have, at least from time to 
time. What can explain this shift? 
One important change, I think, is that our relation with our 
students shifts as we become their examiners. We score and rank 
their performances on tests. For at least half of the class-the 
bottom half-which has never been near the bottom half of any-
thing in its life, this is a dreadful experience. As they struggle to 
improve their performances, students in this situation often dis-
cover both that the standard law-school examination tests a 
rather limited range of abilities and that substantial improve-
ment on that measure may not be possible for them. This dis-
covery is likely to lead them to think that improvement of their 
minds in other ways is not possible either (in law school at least) 
and that they must accept a lower rank in the world, and in 
their own esteem, than they had hoped or expected. This is a 
serious blow. It frequently results in a decision to wait out the 
whole process of law school, looking forward instead to the new 
competitive tests that life itself will offer. Sometimes it results 
in a kind of basic demoralization. The disappointed student is in 
fact caught in a serious dilemma: he can not change his position 
in the hierarchy but he cannot reject it either-for to reject it 
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would also be to reject much of what his remaining self-esteem 
paradoxically rests upon, i.e., wonderful grades in the past, pre-
sent status at a high prestige school, and so on. Those who do 
well on these exams are from a long-range point of view not very 
much better off, for they are invited to have a rather exagger-
ated sense of what their capacity to perform on these tests actu-
ally means: about their minds, about their need for a more gen-
eral and thorough-going education, and about their likely 
success in the world. 
In fact, we all know that examinations of the traditional sort 
do test for certain capacities of mind (and to some degree for 
certain qualities of character as well-industry for example) and 
that one can properly take a certain pleasure in doing well, a 
certain disappointment in doing badly, on such tests. But both 
the pleasure and the disappointment should be far more severely 
qualified than they usually are, because we also know that these 
tests do not test everything that matters, nor, by a very long 
· shot, everything that matters in the practice of law; and that the 
purely competitive impulses stimulated by such tests are a very 
poor basis upon which to rest a professional life, or professional 
satisfaction. 
Why, then, does grading have such powerful effects on morale, 
if I am right that it does, and why is it so difficult for students to 
qualify their sense of satisfaction and disappointment in a real-
istic and appropriate way? Perhaps partly because the faculty 
really believes (or seems to believe) much more deeply in grad-
ing than it claims; perhaps partly because employers use (or 
seem to use) grades so rigidly in hiring; and perhaps partly be-
cause the examination process offers almost no information to 
the student beyond a grade. And other factors no doubt contrib-
ute to the change too: the cumulative effect of a kind of teaching 
that is intolerant of error (when everyone knows that the free-
dom to make mistakes is important to learning, essential to in-
vention); the increasing sense that the faculty's claims (of which 
this article is one) to be interested in "process" or "thinking like 
a lawyer," not in the "rules," are in practice undercut, even ren-
dered hypocritical, by our anxieties about "coverage" (which are, 
after all, not explicable in any language we speak to our stu-
dents); the deadening effect of the repetition of our standard 
law-teacher moves, such as putting the burden of proof on an-
other and remaining "sceptical" or "unpersuaded"; the loss of 
our own sense that what is at stake in our subject, and in our 
classes, is the nature of justice and the good community; our evi-
dent enjoyment of our position of power, not to say of infallibil-
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ity, in the classroom; and the increasingly apparent divergence 
between our own careers and those for which our students are 
for the most part preparing. Whatever the reason, one is often 
told that there is a felt transformation in the later years, with 
far-ranging consequences. 
The case-method, for example, is likely to be seen no longer as 
a method of exploration and dialectic, a technique for discover-
ing what is problematic in the law or in life, but as a way of 
distancing oneself from that-a way of reducing experience to 
the level of the Gilbert's Outline. The implied contract between 
the student and teacher shifts its focus: our insistence to the 
student that "You are responsible for these texts as you have 
never been responsible for anything in your life" all too fre-
quently becomes the acceptance of a correlative, "and responsi-
ble for nothing else in the world." The focus on discrete texts, 
and the chain of texts, which is the key to the concentration of 
attention in the first year, thus becomes a focus on doctrine in a 
vacuum. Such a class-I speak now of my own experience, as 
student and as teacher-is likely to proceed by plowing through 
a casebook at just the wrong speed, with just the wrong attitude: 
too fast to engage in real analysis of the cases or questions 
presented, too slowly to function as an overview. The teacher 
eagerly accepts responsibility for the running of the class-after 
all, this is his professional performance and he prides himself on 
his skill and showmanship-and the students cheerfully acqui-
esce in this assumption, and agree to praise one teacher, or 
blame another, for this performance, almost as though he or she 
were a TV actor. "Good teaching" becomes related to the enter-
taining way one can "get material across." The student can re-
duce the course to the black-letter law, either through hornbook 
or the more laborious method of reading the cases; the teacher 
cannot prevent it and his examination in any event seems to ask 
for nothing that a bright student cannot provide on the basis of 
hornbook reading. 
Law school on such terms trivializes law and education alike. 
The traditional case-book form often reinforces this trivializa-
tion, for it presents severely edited opinions as if they were all 
that one needed to know, and often does the same with other 
writers as well-a paragraph each from Bentham, Kant, and 
Plato, for example. The whole thing feels to some like a charade, 
a complex way of doing something that is at heart rather simple 
and unimportant. For me the core of the evil lies in the defini-
tion of poles and relation: the definition of the teacher as the 
powerful and knowledgeable manipulator; of the student as a 
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kind of child or infant, without any responsibility beyond pre-
paring for a routine examination; of the material as legal rules 
and principles embedded in cases or statutes. Legal education 
seems no longer to be learning to think like a lawyer but learn-
ing to think like a bar exam. Or so many of our students feel. 
That our students are our partners in this reduction of law 
school (and of themselves) you can see if you imagine for a mo-
ment the outcry that would result if a class were told that it · 
would be examined on something not "covered" in class. (And 
listen to the way the word "pass" is often uttered, as if it were 
an accepted move in a game, like a bid at bridge.) Many teach-
ers respond to this by becoming lecturers, a form of teaching 
and of life that has its own rewards. 
Is THE CARICATURE TRUE? 
I have presented a caricatured view of law school life with 
what may seem to the reader a constant shifting of signals as to 
whether I think it is "true" or not. Those shifts have been delib-
erate because I think the caricature is in a sense both "true" and 
"false." Certainly no first-year class lives up to the ideal and one 
hopes that no course in the later years fits my negative descrip-
tion either. For some students the sequence may well be re-
versed: first year may seem empty or trivial, mere game-playing, 
the later years full of useful substance. Certainly the faculty at 
this school offers a wide range of courses that in substance and 
method vary greatly from the stereotype; and by all accounts 
many of the most successful courses are among the most "tradi-
tional." And let me repeat that my own experience of students 
here has been very satisfactory indeed. What is true is that 
many of us carry something like this image in our mind. I think 
the reason is, as I said earlier, that this image expresses forces 
we feel at work, in our classes and ourselves. To some degree 
there are obvious causes: the newness of first year cannot con-
tinue into the second; large class size, which permits first-year 
case analysis, may inhibit more suggestive, exploratory, or inven-
tive methods of teaching in the later years; students' concern 
with employment becomes increasingly dominant, and it is natu-
ral that their attention will be to some degree diverted from a 
present intellectual life to an unlived future; and ranking by 
grades, as I suggested above, is a powerful blow to many,· who 
take the rest of their work in a state of mind my colleague Rick 
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Lempert calls a "mental pass-fail." If attention is elsewhere, ed-
ucation cannot go on. 
IMAGINING ANOTHER VERSION 
Can we imagine, or see around us, another sort of law school, 
in which the students go on from the first year not to contract 
but to expand their sense of responsibility for what they learn?° 
In which they are offered courses that they can see as doing 
something other than presenting doctrine in a vacuum-courses 
in which the teacher need not be afraid of Gilbert's, or some 
other aid, but actually encourages the use of whatever will help 
the student, because the teacher is confident that the course she 
gives, and the examination she offers, cannot be reduced to that 
level? In which students are spoken to-and welcome it-as if 
they had intellectual lives and agendas of their own, back-
grounds and futures that are not fungible? 
Imagine what it might be like to teach a graduate course in 
British nineteenth century history, for example: we would not 
assume that everything that counted would be said or referred 
to-"covered"-in. class, but rather that the class would treat a 
set of questions, chosen for their interest and importance, as ex-
amples of the historical mind at work. The students would be 
assumed to know much more, and to learn much more, about 
this period and its history than was ever said in class. Bibliogra-
phies too large for any one to read would be circulated. The idea 
would be that each student was different; each was engaged in 
an educative process for which he was responsible; that each 
would be tested, not in a single examination, but by a compre-
hensive examination which would reveal his own pattern of 
strengths and weaknesses, and ultimately by the profession, by 
the quality of work that he could show that he could do across a 
lifetime. Such a history course would not teach facts or themes 
or doctrine in a vacuum: it would take place in a context, partly 
of the student's making, including prior reading, contemporane-
ous reading and independent thought, and an imagined future 
intellectual life. Could law school work on such premises, such 
relations? 
The object of this analogy with the (no doubt idealized) his-
tory course is to suggest that one can see what goes wrong in law 
school by thinking about another kind of triadic relation be-
tween the teacher, the student, and the material. Can we find a 
way to teach that recognizes that our students' capacities and 
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virtues are different from one another? That we ourselves have 
different things to teach? That the subject "law" is not the same 
in every classroom any more than the subject "history" is? And 
can the students find a way to assume more responsibility for 
their own education, conceiving of themselves as engaged in a 
project that has its own interest and importance to them, inde-
pendent of its significance as pre-license training? Can their ed-
ucation be seen as truly a liberal education, i.e., as the develop-
ment of their own individual capacities, not as a training into a 
sort of sameness? Put slightly differently, can we come to see 
that the law that we teach, and that we hold out as entitled to 
respect and authority, is not a set of rules to be learned but a set 
of ways of thinking and talking and acting together about ques-
tions of justice, a method and a community which it should be 
our task to exemplify and constitute? 
The starting point would be to conceive of legal education not 
as professional training alone but as the education of the indi-
vidual mind. In such an education, courses would not be reduci-
ble to the bar review, to the outline, or to the set of rules-to 
the doctrine taught-for the subject of the courses would not be 
"material" in that learnable sense, but rather the mind of the 
student (and also, though it perhaps reveals a professional secret 
to say so, the mind of the teacher) in relation to that material. 
The materials of law would be contextualized by being made the 
object of individual thought, the character of which was the true 
subject of attention. This of course makes hard and practical 
professional sense, for the most valuable attainment that a stu-
dent will carry with her from our law school into the great world 
is not intellectual baggage in the form of boxes and trunks full 
of rules, distinctions, arguments, and so on, but a more fully ed-
ucated mind. And her mind is also the organ by which she will 
claim to find or make meaning in her life-including moral 
meaning-, the organ by which she will organize her own experi-
ence into a coherent and tolerable whole. The most "practical" 
education is perhaps not the most theoretical one, certainly not 
the most academic; but it is the most intellectual education one 
can obtain or imagine. 
Her mind is trained, of course, in a specific professional con-
text-it is the language of the law, not of medicine or linguistics 
that the law student learns to understand, to recast, to remake, 
and this part of the training is also important. But this fact is 
secondary: the kind of knowledge with which a true education is 
concerned is never repeatable data, but a knowledge that entails 
a use or activity-a knowledge of practice that is a kind of ac-
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tion, including a kind of invention or creation. The practice of 
law is not the application of doctrine learned in law school to the 
facts of a client's case, for in one's practice the doctrine must be 
learned-and that means rethought, reconstructed-over and 
over again, from many points of view. What you learn in law 
school is not law in the sense of repeatable propositions but how 
to learn law-that is, how to do it and how to make it. In an 
important sense "the law" one studies is thus the law that is 
actually made in the classroom, made out of the materials of 
case and statute, as the class thinks and talks about particular 
questions. A good law school is thus a school of law-making. 
This means that the proper focus of attention is not on what the 
student is learning to repeat or to describe but what she is learn-
ing to see and to do; on the doctrine or language of the law not 
abstracted from experience, but embedded in it, as the object 
and medium of thought, expression, and intellectual action. 
The moment of speech is the moment of our attention. Once 
you start rattling off those cliches your mind is running in a 
channel from which it will not easily shift, and so is the mind of 
your interlocutor, and that part of the world which you have the 
power to make, and the responsibility for making, becomes im-
measurably poorer. Yet a moment of true speech by an individ-
ual voice speaking to others as they actually are about the facts 
of the world-at such a moment, whether in a poem or a legal 
argument or a classroom, the world is reborn. 
The moment of speech, when knowledge is made active, is a 
moment that calls for art (rather than science or technology) be-
cause the circumstances to which one speaks are never those to 
which one has spoken before. The new lawyer is surprised to dis-
cover that in practice no case ever comes to him as a clean-cut 
paradigmatic case, but always has uncertainties, ambiguities, 
rough edges, and paradoxes built into it. This is so because the 
case comes from life, not from the exposition of a theory, and 
these are the qualities of actual human experience. To deal with 
the fact that circumstance and culture constantly change, the 
mind must have not a grid of established moves but the capacity 
to invent new moves. Lessons and advice wear quickly thin; no 
science exists upon which one's cognition of the world can rest; 
the only possible guide is internal, a kind of gyroscope that en-
ables the vessel to maintain stability and direction in a world 
that is entirely fluid, and relative, without external 
landmarks-the capacities of an Odysseus, confident that he can 
meet a new situation with intelligence by focusing on what it 
actually is. 
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In this kind of legal education the student is defined not as a 
learner of facts and doctrines and rules, nor even as the learner 
of a set of rhetorical moves-of the means of persuasion availa-
ble to the lawyer-but as a speaker and writer, the maker of new 
compositions. Attention is focused on what the student can find 
(or make) to say, and upon the resources and limits of his mind 
and his language. 1 
This conception of the student is inherently egalitarian. If two 
people speak to each other as composers they must speak as fel-
low composers; no imaginable relation other than equality can 
exist between them, for they share a situation that is at root 
identical and they focus their attention on what is common in 
their lot and life. To conceive of the student as composer is also 
to recognize his autonomy and individuality, for composition is 
of necessity an independent act done by individual minds. The 
student who learns to compose in legal language learns some-
thing of his own responsibility for what he does; of his own 
strengths and weaknesses; of his own place in the world. At best 
he makes a voice of his own: not a private voice, not the voice of 
any-person-talking-as-a-lawyer, but a voice of his own as a law-
yer. In my own view, indeed, that could be taken as the central 
aim of a legal education. 
This sort of education is also a kind of moral education, for it 
is a training in the responsibilities of the self that resists the 
contemporary tendencies towards nihilism and authoritarianism 
alike. The lawyer is trained to recognize and respect authorities 
external to the individual will or whim: the authority of the law 
and the authority of the experience of other people. This train-
ing takes place in the constant establishment of community with 
others-clients, other lawyers, judges-and in the maintenance 
of the language by which community itself is defined and made 
possible. From this point of view the true significance of legal 
education-what makes it worth doing for the student and for 
the teacher alike-is that it is inherently antibureaucratic and 
antiauthoritarian: it insists upon the reality both of the individ-
1. Of course legal composition is of a special kind, for much of it is based upon inter-
pretation, the working out of competing or alternative meanings for various authoritative 
texts-statutes, common law cases, constitutions-both alone and in connection with 
each other. The legal analyst thus is always saying: here is the set of relevant texts (rec-
ognizing that any one inclusion or exclusion may be challenged) and here is the meaning 
that each should have, that they all should have, the meaning that makes the best sense 
of each taken alone and of all taken together. The result is a composition, a way of 
making sense and order of the material of the world. This is true not only at the level of 
analyzing legal texts, but also-perhaps more obviously-at the level of the organization 
of facts, the constitution of reality in negotiations, trials, and conversations. 
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ual person and of the community at large. 
GIVING "DOCTRINE" A CONTEXT: AS A LANGUAGE 
One way to describe the effect of this kind of education is that 
it gives doctrine a context, a context internal to the student and 
the teachers. The language of the law is not regarded as a dis-
crete entity, a world of its own, but as a language that must be 
used-and remade-by this individual mind or that one, func-
tioning in one actual or imagined situation or another. The rules 
are not studied as though they were of interest in themselves 
but as the material for speech in real or imagined circumstances. 
This focus of attention leads directly to the mind's sense of it-
self, to its nature, to its cultural circumstances, to the possibili-
ties and limits of speech and understanding, to the recognition 
of others similarly situated, and so on. This conception of law as 
an expressive and rhetorical activity is not reducible to learning 
how to manipulate doctrine, as the lawyer's life is so often 
thought to be. It is not enough to move sentences about ori the 
page of the mind in shifting patterns, inserting "nots" and 
"buts" in new places, recasting the materials of the cases, and so 
on. The mind must be a source of its own energy, of invention, 
of what the rhetoricians called ingenium: the power to make 
something new. This has at least two sides: the power to ask new 
questions of the world, of the client and the witnesses and the 
files-to ask questions that will generate new material; and the 
capacity to organize it all in new ways, as a new story, with its 
own starting point, direction, movement, and ending-to re-
create or represent the world in language. 
How is the power of invention to be stimulated? Partly by re-
peatedly presenting the problems the lawyer faces as problems 
for speech and argument, for individual responsibility and judg-
ment-this will bring to bear the students' ordinary-life capacity 
for speaking and judging, for inventing, in new circumstances. 
Partly by our own writing and speech: can we find ways to write 
as law teachers which meet the standards I suggest, of showing 
our individual minds at work in a professional literature? But 
perhaps most by an explicit resistance to the assumptions upon 
which the caricature I described above necessarily rests. 
The first assumption that should go is that everything of im-
portance in the field, or for the exam, will be covered in class. 
We should feel free to treat our students as grown-ups, able to 
read and think on their own. This means we should give them 
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books and articles they might read before the course begins (and 
perhaps even examine them on that reading as a kind of qualifi-
cation for the course); we should identify material we expect 
them to read on their own during the course, including case-
book material; we should offer them guidance to useful summa-
ries of doctrine and the like. This would enable us to proceed at 
a pace slow enough to make some real progress in analyzing par-
ticular texts or sequences of texts and to make the way we en-
gage with those texts, not their "substantive content," our true 
subject. We could be more explicitly exploratory, self-reflective, 
and critical. But this would also require us to give up the claim 
that we "teach it all," or that our courses are necessary for pass-
ing a bar exam. (We should actually welcome the proliferation of 
bar review courses, for they make it easier for us to make clear 
to our students that our job is different from that one.) It may 
seem impossible to do the kind of work we and our students are 
ready to do in classes as large as those we currently teach. This 
sense of frustration, if real enough, might lead to some changes 
in class size. In the interim, we should think about doing some 
kinds of teaching to huge classes in order to make another kind 
of teaching, to smaller classes, also possible. 
GIVING "DOCTRINE" A CONTEXT: BY COMPARISON 
So far I have suggested that doctrine can be given a context 
by being regarded, in any course, as a language that the student 
must learn to use, and to remake, in individual cases. The con-
text is that of the mind faced with its own limits and those of its 
resources, and this kind of context-making could go on in any 
course, if teacher and student took the time and paid the atten-
tion necessary to it. But there is another kind of contextualiza-
tion that may both give legal doctrine meaning and encourage 
the development of the capacity for invention, one that would 
require a new course or set of courses: this is the study of intel-
lectual analogies to law. If we can contrast legal language, legal 
methods of thought, and legal communities with others, we may 
gain an insight and purchase that will make invention and re-
form more thinkable and possible. One field of analogy, already 
suggested, is ordinary life: in talking about contracts we should 
not forget, and we should invite our students to remember, what 
we know of promises and expectations in ordinary life; likewise, 
when we talk in the criminal law of "blameworthiness" or "de-
sert" we should remind ourselves of our own practices of blam-
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ing and judging of desert; when we think about "vagueness" we 
should think about what makes expressions clear and unclear in 
ordinary life; and so on. 
Another source of analogy is the field defined by other intel-
lectual disciplines. The object of the kind of study I have in 
mind would not be that the lawyer would acquire the "insights" 
or "information" generated by other experts, but that we would 
study the intellectual activities that others engage in and con-
trast them with our own. Not law and sociology for example, or 
law and history, but law as each of these: what kind of sociology 
does this court unwittingly practice, what kind of history? What 
are the other possibilities for thought and expression, suggested 
by the practices of historians and sociologists, that the law 
should consider? What is truly distinctive about law? Similar 
questions can be asked of other activities: anthropology, litera-
ture, economics, philosophy, and the like. These contrasts and 
comparisons, like those with ordinary life, should suggest new 
possibilities for thought and argument, new analogies upon 
which to draw in inventing lines of thought and speech. This is a 
different view of interdisciplinary work from the usual models, 
for each of the disciplines would be looked at as I suggest law 
should be looked at: with an eye to its special resources and to 
its limits as well. An important consequence of this kind of 
study is that it would bring to the center of consciousness, where 
they could be studied and criticized, the assumptions underlying 
the culture of law, and of our larger culture, enabling law better 
to perform its functions of cultural criticism and transformation. 
Let me give just one example of what such a study might take 
as a specific subject. I have from the beginning of this paper 
been describing something called law school, or this law school, 
in a way that I have marked as uncertain or unusual by calling it 
a caricature. I have said it is partly true and partly false: per-
haps it is true in the way a myth or an ideology is true, or true 
as an expression of feelings of anxiety or fear-perhaps momen-
tary feelings, perhaps structural ones. But it is also false: as an 
account of this course, this faculty, this student body. And cer-
tainly my account has been less than satisfactory to me and I 
suppose to you. What is the truth of it? What special kind of 
truth may such a caricature have in general? Here we face aver-
sion of a question that is present whenever we speak as lawyers 
(or as law professors) about our world-about what happens 
when "cops" arrest "suspects," for example, about the fear of 
crime in our cities, about the nature of progress ( or the reverse) 
in our treatment of the environment, or civil rights, or labor jus-
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tice, or the securities markets. What would good sociologists, an-
thropologists, psychologists, economists, and historians say 
about the caricature I have given you? What questions would 
they ask? What story would they tell? 
I have said that doctrine should be removed from its "vac-
uum" and placed in a "context," and you may wonder why I 
have not suggested, what many would think obvious, that we 
place it in the context of the "real world." My point here is that 
there is no one "real world" which can serve as a context, but a 
variety of often wildly differing constructs of reality. The. pro-
cess by which we and others create social realities is the central 
subject of such a course or program as I describe. 
When this emphasis is combined with the conception of legal 
education as legal literacy described above, something else flows 
from these comparisons: recognition of the individuality of our 
sources of meaning and authority. In a course such as I describe 
we could not aim, any more than the historians could aim, for a 
single view of what law is and of its relations to all the other 
disciplines; each student, and each teacher, would have to draw 
his or her own connections and make them vivid and persuasive 
in compositions of his or her own. If carried over to the field of 
formal legal writing, it would mean the end of dead and in-
authentic references-like Chief Justice Burger's reference to 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations,2 made as if the ref-
erence were to his own reading and that of his audience, and like 
the dreadful canned history that appears in many opinions and 
briefs, reflecting no work by the writer, no knowledge of history, 
no engagement in the process of historical judgment, but a sim-
ple cut-and-paste job from other texts-as if all learning could 
be reduced to the model of universally available and comprehen-
sible precedents. If it worked well, this sort of training in analo-
gous disciplines would create a group of voices speaking authen-
tically about the analogies they drew; and it would further break 
down the stereotype that authority is dead and universal, rather 
than living and recreated on the page. 
How might this be done, practically speaking? One possibility 
would be to start with an experimental voluntary second track 
of legal education in the third year (or perhaps the second and 
third year) which would be explicitly organized to create a dif-
ferent relationship among teacher, student, and material. The 
aim would be the contextualization of doctrine: internally, by 
recognizing it as a language that one must learn to use; and ex-
2. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 284 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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ternally, by attention to analogous disciplines. Such a program 
could have a central core course, devoted to the comparison of 
legal and other disciplines; the teaching of doctrine through lec-
ture and reading; the careful exploration of a small number of 
cases, viewed as the occasion for the discovery of the resources 
and limits of legal speech; all with the idea of developing a sense 
of autonomy, individuality, competence, responsibility, and a ca-
pacity to invent. This might especially attract students who are 
academically inclined, but I think it would also prove its value 
as purely professional training. Certainly it would do so if it in-
creased the students' sense of the importance and interest of 
what they were doing in law school and thus drew their atten-
tion to their present lives, away from their future ones; if it 
broke down the sense, in faculty and students alike, that we are 
engaged in an intellectual routine; if it seemed to build upon 
rather than repeat the first year; and if it seemed in some sense 
to be about the character that a just community, and a trustwor-
thy lawyer, should have. 
